In this engaging and well-written volume, Thomas Nagel squeezes a good deal of political mileage out of his perpetual distinction between the personal and impersonal points of view. Here he finds a difficulty striking the right balance between -- as his title suggests -- equality and partiality.His contention is that when I abstract from my pursuit of my own values, I am able to see myself as just one person among others and recognize that -- in an absolute, view-from-nowhere sense -- other persons are just as "important" as I am. Thus arises a conflict within myself between the "personal" and "impersonal" points of view -- or between partiality toward my own values and interests, on the one hand, and impartiality, on the other.
Nagel is careful to note that he is _not_ arguing against personality/partiality altogether. On the contrary, he thinks there is an important place in the world for purely agent-relative values. He just doesn't think that's all there are.
Nor is he primarily interested in drawing conclusions; his main concern is to try to set out the issues clearly. And at any rate, his main (tentative) conclusion is the comparatively tame one that it is possible and desirable to establish social institutions which provide a guaranteed minimal level of well-being to everyone. (I entirely agree that this would be a Good Thing, assuming that I am allowed to construe "social institutions" in the broadest possible fashion. But it is a long leap from "not, strictly speaking, morally optional" to "properly mandated by the positive law of the State," and I do not see that Nagel makes that leap any more effectively than Alan Gewirth.)
And although he follows Parfit in giving the greatest weight to improvements for the worst off, he is not in favor of forcibly "equalizing" everyody in a Harrison-Bergeron sort of way. (But don't worry; libertarians will find plenty to disagree with all the same.)
The heart of his case is the alleged conflict between personal and impersonal viewpoints. I take it that he thinks some, but not all, of our "personal" values will survive the transition to the "impersonal" point of view. The ones that survive this transition are, roughly, the ones it might be okay to tax people in support of.
Now, frankly, Nagel's perceived difficulty seems to arise from a miscasting of the problem. On the one hand, surely all values are "agent-relative" in the minimal sense that (a) every value depends (as Nagel himself admits) on the existence of at least one valuing agent, and (b) every intrinsic value is realized or actualized in someone's experience. (I am not sure whether Nagel follows W.D. Ross, as I do, in holding that all intrinsic goods are states of mind or relations between them.)
On the other hand, surely there is also an "impartial" point of view from which we can see, and say, that (other things equal) the fulfillment of agent-relative values is simply _good_, period. In this sense, even the most irreducibly personal (and otherwise unproblematic) value is _also_ an "impersonal" value which any rational agent can see to be, _ceteris paribus_, worth fulfilling for its own sake -- i.e., an intrinsic good. In that case the "personal-ness" of a value is strictly a matter of degree; its "impersonal-ness" is not; and the two are not even contraries, let alone mutually exclusive.
If that is right, then the real problem Nagel is addressing is not a conflict between agent-relative and agent-neutral values at all (his distinction between which Christine Korsgaard has criticized on other grounds in "The Reasons We Can Share," reprinted in _Creating the Kingdom of Ends_). It is the arguably more manageable problem of how individual agents are to set priorities among their values (including those they ideally should have).
Which raises the corollary question of how far individual agents become _responsible_ for one another's well-being simply through the rational insight that such well-being is "good, period." For _ceteris_ is seldom _paribus_, and it is just not the case that insight into an intrinsic good necessarily imposes an obligation on the possessor of the insight.
It is obviously possible to recognize the intrinsic goodness of a past event without thereby becoming obliged to bring about what has, after all, already occurred. It is also possible to recognize the intrinsic goodness (or otherwise) of a possible future event without thereby obliging oneself to make it happen (or prevent it); even if this is a _prima facie_ duty, it is easily overruled. Your trip to the dentist will no doubt produce some pain (an intrinsic evil), but you are not therefore obliged to refrain from going; still less am I obliged to prevent you. And without sorting through the messy matter of personal responsibility, we cannot simply conclude that the "impersonal" point of view imposes any particular obligations on particular persons.
But I don't think Nagel quite comes to grips with the question of personal responsibility/duty, and I suspect this is because, as Korsgaard notes, he is really a "consequentialist" rather than a Kantian: he thinks ethics is for the sole purpose of _bringing about some overall result_. If this view is denied, and especially if his distinction between "personal" and "impersonal" values is also found wanting, then his argument is an extended _ignoratio elenchi_.
There are other difficulties: for example, his Rawlsian contention that people do not "deserve" their talents, the difficulty or impossibility of meaningfully measuring equality of outcome, and the fact that so much of his discussion takes place at the level of the "collective." But space will not permit discussion of those.
In any case, though, I agree with reviewer Chris Cathcart (below) that Nagel's work should be read by political theorists of all stripes. The problems he raises are real, whether his formulation of them is ultimately satisfactory or not. And frankly, few volumes from the libertarian camp display Nagel's intellectual honesty, clarity, and nuance.
